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The Effect of Stress on Hedonic Capacity in Generalized Anxiety Disorder:  
A Prospective Experimental Study of One Potential Pathway to Depression 
 
Bethany H. Morris 
ABSTRACT 
A growing body of work links psychopathology to changes in hedonic capacity 
following stressors. This was the first experimental study of the effects of stress on 
hedonic capacity in an analog generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) sample (a high worry 
group). Specifically, we utilized an experimental manipulation of stress and a behavioral 
index of anhedonia to test the hypothesis that individuals with GAD, who are at higher 
risk for developing depression symptoms, exhibit greater stress-related deficits in hedonic 
capacity than do nonanxious controls. Further, this study assessed whether stress-induced 
hedonic deficits predicted future depression. Controls exhibited the expected reward 
learning pattern in the baseline condition, demonstrating intact hedonic responding, as 
well as the expected pattern of behavioral anhedonia under stress. Contrary to 
predictions, worriers demonstrated intact hedonic capacity under stress. The stress effect 
in worriers was modulated by past depression diagnostic status; whereas worriers with no 
past depression demonstrated blunted baseline hedonic capacity and heightened hedonic 
capacity under stress, worriers with past depression demonstrated the normative response 
pattern. Blunted baseline response bias predicted higher future depression in both groups. 
We discuss the differential stress effects on behavioral hedonic capacity found as a 
function of worry, the role of past depression as a moderator of stress effects among 
worriers, and the need for future work to further explicate the mechanisms that may 
modulate reward response under stress.  
 
 
vi 
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Introduction 
Major Depressive Disorder 
  Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a common psychiatric syndrome 
characterized by significant affective dysfunctions, including the cardinal symptoms of 
persistent low mood and/or a marked decrease in the experience of pleasurable activities 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). Associated MDD symptoms include fatigue, lack 
of concentration, appetite changes, sleep disturbance, feelings of worthlessness, 
psychomotor agitation or retardation, and thoughts of suicide. MDD tends to be recurrent 
and imposes a high long-term disease burden, leading many researchers to conceptualize 
it as more of a chronic condition (e.g., diabetes) than as an acute syndrome (Vos, Haby, 
Barendregt, Kruijshaar, Corry, & Andrews, 2004). Given the debilitating nature and high 
prevalence of MDD, investigators have sought variables that predict its onset and course.  
Many factors have been implicated in the etiology of depression, including 
genetic variations (Caspi et al., 2003), personality factors (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, & 
Heath, 1993), stressful life events (Monroe, Slavich, Torres, & Gotlib, 2007), and 
previous onset of other psychopathology, especially generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; 
Merikangas et al., 2003). In fact, many depression investigators agree that single risk 
factors (e.g., gender) are rarely sufficient to explain MDD and that it is useful to consider 
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how multiple risk factors interact to produce depression outcomes (Hammen, 2005; 
Luyten, Blatt, & Houdenhove, 2006; Monroe & Simons, 1991).  
One rich and compelling set of theories that address the interaction of depression 
risk factors are diathesis–stress theories (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; Hammen, 1991; 
Post, 1992). Diathesis–stress theories generally posit that predisposing individual 
difference variables interact with environmental factors to produce a depressive episode 
(Monroe & Simons, 1991). Diathesis–stress models thus provide a natural theoretical 
backbone for research aimed at understanding how risk factors, such as stress and GAD, 
interact and create potential pathways to depression.  
 
Overview of the Literature Review 
The current study takes an experimental, process-level approach to examining 
how stress interacts with a key proposed diathesis (premorbid GAD) to form a potential 
pathway to depression. First, diathesis–stress models of depression are described as well 
as how these models have been tested. Next, we discuss findings from longitudinal, 
naturalistic studies that suggest GAD may modify the depressogenic effects of stress, 
enhancing vulnerability to a depressive episode following stress. Then, anhedonia, a key 
feature of depression, is considered and findings about its role in the stress–depression 
relationship are discussed. Lastly, the purpose and rationale for a laboratory study of the 
stress–depression relationship is given as well as a discussion of how the present design 
advances the literature on stress, GAD, and depression.  
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Two Methods to Study the Stress–Depression Relationship 
  Both field and laboratory methodologies have been used to study the stress-
depression relationship. There has been particular interest in longitudinal, 
epidemiological field studies of the impact of stressful life events on the development of 
depressive episodes (reviewed in Hammen, 2005; Kessler, 1997; Mazure, 1998). A 
substantial literature has emerged which examines the phenomenological and temporal 
relationship between life stress and depression in studies that retain high ecological 
validity.  Laboratory stress studies employ experimental control of stress, allowing 
researchers to isolate specific processes or mechanisms involved in stress responding and 
potentially affording stronger causal inferences than field studies. Whereas the cost of a 
laboratory model is uncertain ecological validity, the benefit is the ability to explicate 
theory and findings of naturalistic life stress studies by experimentally testing hypotheses 
about causal processes. As discussed below, there is already strong evidence in the non-
experimental life stress literature that stress and other risk factors are related to 
subsequent depression. Experimental studies are needed to examine potential causal 
mechanisms underlying this large effect. Though the present study takes an experimental 
approach, the non-experimental life stress literature is important to review because 1) 
findings from the non-experimental life stress literature inspired much of the theoretical 
basis of the present study, and 2) little experimental literature on stress and depression 
bears strongly on this topic. 
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Diathesis–Stress Models of Depression 
 Diathesis–stress models in the depression arena (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978), 
have been used to explicate the role of stressful life events in the development of 
depressive episodes. Consistent with diathesis–stress models, life stress is consistently 
associated with onset of a depressive episode (Kessler, 1997; for a review, see Mazure, 
1998). Although initial findings in this area were tempered by varied operationalizations 
of life stress (e.g., acute versus chronic; Monroe & Simons, 1991) and research designs 
which offered limited ability to draw causal inferences about life stress and depression 
(Kessler, 1997), recent work has moved away from simple dose-response models of 
stress and depression and towards more complex models that focus on the interaction 
between risk factors, stressors, and depression (e.g., Monroe & Harkness, 2005). 
Although a complete review of major views and relevant findings is beyond our present 
scope, it is useful to note two major themes of this literature: a) the life stress–depression 
relationship is dynamic, and that b) other variables (e.g., risk factors) likely interact with 
life stress, enhancing or blunting its depressive effects (for reviews see Hammen, 2005; 
Mazure, 1998; Monroe & Harkness, 2005).   
  
Variables that Modify the Depressive Effects of Stress 
 An estimated 70% of first onset depressive episodes are preceded by recent major 
life events (Monroe & Harkness, 2005). However, “the majority of people exposed to all 
but the most extreme stressful life experiences do not become depressed. An attempt is 
made to explain this finding and, more generally, individual differences in stress 
reactivity by searching for characteristics of the individual or the environment in which 
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the individual is embedded that modify stress effects” (Kessler, 1997, p. 207). Thus, 
individual difference (e.g., genes, personality traits) or situational variables (e.g., poverty 
or other long term chronic stress), can influence whether a major life stressor induces a 
depressive episode. These variables have been defined by Kessler (1997) as “aspects of 
the personal and situational environments of people exposed to stressful events that are 
associated with variation in the impact of these events on their probability of becoming 
depressed” (p. 201). These factors are sometimes referred to as “stress modifiers” and 
“stress-buffering factors, vulnerability factors, or stress–diathesis factors” (Kessler, 1997, 
p. 207). Recent work has emphasized a dynamic, interactive relationship between the 
individual and the environment (e.g., Luyten et al., 2006) and has begun to examine how 
these factors can interact to modify the effect of stress on depression. In other words, the 
key question is about what factors predispose certain people to become depressed after a 
stressor.  One line of research, for instance, looks at depression itself as a predisposing 
factor because depression often leads to subsequent stress (stress generation; Hammen, 
1991). Researchers have examined several other factors which may modify the effect of 
stress on depression including neuroticism (e.g., Kendler, Kuhn, & Prescott, 2004), 
negative attributional style (e.g., Kwon & Laurenceau, 2002; Reff, Kwon, & Campbell, 
2005); genetic vulnerability (e.g., Caspi et al., 2003) as well as several forms of 
premorbid psychopathology, including anxiety psychopathology (e.g., Friis, Wittchen, 
Pfister, & Lieb, 2002; Hettema, Kuhn, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006). 
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Generalized Anxiety Disorder as a Risk Factor for Depression 
 Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), a diagnosis characterized by at least six 
months of anxiety symptoms, including chronic, uncontrollable worry (DSM-IV, APA, 
2000), is a known risk factor for depression that may sensitize people to the depressive 
effects of stress. GAD and MDD are often comorbid (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 
2005; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994). Specifically, MDD is more highly 
related to GAD than any other anxiety disorder (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; 
Kessler, Chiu, et al., 2005), with the most common pattern of onset being GAD predating 
the first onset of depression (Breslau, Schultz, & Peterson, 1995). Though substantial 
evidence suggests that GAD and MDD share a common genetic diathesis (e.g., Kendler, 
Kessler, Walters, & MacLean, 1995; Kendler, Gardner, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2007) and a 
shared “general distress” component (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998), much is still 
unknown about the comorbidity of these two disorders. For example, why does GAD so 
often predate its comorbid counterpart, MDD?  
Given the possibly shared diathesis of GAD and MDD, their high comorbidity 
rate, and their often sequential onset (i.e., that GAD often predates depression), work is 
needed to investigate potential pathways that exist from premorbid GAD to depression. 
In a recent study that specifically investigated whether GAD and stress may interact to 
predict depression onset, Hettema et al. (2006) examined prior GAD diagnosis, stressful 
life events, and depression onset in a large twin sample (N=8,068). Individuals with prior 
GAD were more vulnerable to the “depressogenic” effects of stressful life events, 
regardless of the level of objective threat imposed by the event. These findings suggest 
that GAD may sensitize individuals to the depression-causing effects of stressful life 
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events (Hettema et al., 2006). Previous findings in the same sample implicated 
neuroticism as a stress-modifier as well; individuals with higher levels of neuroticism 
were also more sensitive to the depression-inducing effects of stressful life events 
(Kendler et al., 2004). Hettema et al. (2006) suggested, “neurotic traits index one’s 
genetic susceptibility to either GAD or MDD, with other factors (modifier genes or 
environmental factors such as stressful life events) determining the often observed 
sequence of GAD predating MDD” (Hettema et al., 2006, p.794). That is, higher 
neuroticism enhances the depressogenic effects of life stress, especially among those who 
have already developed GAD, which is a “more proximal and potent risk factor for 
MDD” (Hettema et al., 2006, p.794). In sum, neuroticism and premorbid GAD may 
interact with stress to form a pathway to depression. 
 
The Contributing Role of Neuroticism 
Depression researchers have increasingly examined ways that neuroticism may 
operate to increase depression vulnerability.  Hammen (2005) notes the potential for 
neuroticism to inform diathesis-stress theories of depression “because of its implication 
for understanding stress generation and stress reactivity, and as a candidate for aspects of 
genetic risk for depression” (Hammen, 2005). Neuroticism may for example reflect the 
working of an underlying genetic factor (Kendler et al., 1993), which modifies the effects 
of stress on depression (Kessler, 1997). For instance, Caspi et al. (2003) found that a 
polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR), which has been associated 
with neuroticism (Schinka, Busch, & Robichaux-Keene, 2004; Sen et al., 2004; cf., Risch 
et al., 2009), moderated the effects of stress on the subsequent development of 
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depression. Further, Jacobs et al. (2006) found that the relationship of 5-HTTLPR to the 
depressive effects of stressful life events was accounted for by neuroticism. The authors 
suggest that 5-HTTLPR may be responsible for how people characteristically react to and 
manage stress (Jacobs et al., 2006). In sum, neuroticism may represent an underlying 
genetic factor which predisposes some individuals to the depressogenic effects of stress, 
accounting for the relationship between life stress and impending depression (Caspi et al., 
2003; Jacobs et al., 2006; Kendler et al., 2004). In light of these findings and the strong 
relationship that neuroticism has with both depression and anxiety, a measure of 
neuroticism will be included in the current study design (see Morris, Bylsma, & 
Rottenberg, 2009 for a review of neuroticism and depression course).  
 
Hedonic Capacity and the Development of MDD 
Decreased hedonic capacity, or anhedonia, has long been of interest among 
depression researchers (e.g., Meehl, 1975). Anhedonia is a cardinal feature of depression 
and represents a deficit in reward processing (e.g., Forbes & Dahl, 2005; Pizzagalli, Jahn, 
& O'Shea, 2005). Reward processing and approach behavior are thought to be products of 
a theorized approach system seated in the brain (i.e., behavioral activation system, BAS; 
Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1981), which governs all manner of approach-related, 
reward-relevant behaviors. Deficits in BAS, specifically low levels of approach 
tendencies in the trait-like reward system, are related to current and prospective 
depression (Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002). Similarly, low approach 
tendencies (low BAS) may not normalize even upon recovery from depression, with 
anhedonia levels remaining constant even with decreases in depression symptoms (Pinto-
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Meza et al., 2006; Schrader, 2004). Relatedly, lower levels of trait positive affect predict 
a worse course of depression (Morris et al., 2009).  Taken together, these findings suggest 
that deficits in hedonic capacity may be etiologically significant for depression (for a 
review from a developmental psychopathology perspective, see Forbes & Dahl, 2005). 
 
The Effect of Stress of Hedonic Capacity 
  In two field studies of hedonic capacity in healthy individuals, Berenbaum and 
Connelly (1993) examined hedonic capacity before and after experiencing life stress. 
College students reported experiencing less pleasure in their daily lives during a stressful 
period (exam week), and Army cadets reported less pleasure in response to an amusing 
film after a stressful training weekend. Pizzagalli et al. (2007) report similar findings 
when comparing individuals with high and low levels of perceived life stress, as indexed 
by the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983): compared 
with low perceived stress, high perceived stress was related to blunted reward responding 
indexed via a laboratory task. These findings expose one possible pathway from stress to 
depression if even a moderate life stressor (e.g., exam week) can lead to hedonic 
blunting, which is etiologically linked to depression. Stress-induced anhedonia has also 
been observed in animal studies of depression, where various stressors elicit 
depressotypic behaviors in laboratory animals (see Anisman & Matheson, 2005). These 
findings suggest, again, that a normative effect of stress may be the induction of acute 
anhedonia, that is, an immediate decrease in hedonic capacity.  
  Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) suggested that based on previous work, “preclinical 
evidence and limited human research invite the possibility that stress might increase the 
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likelihood of depression development by inducing anhedonia” (p. 1147). This hypothesis 
can be extended to include findings from the life stress literature, which speak to why 
only vulnerable individuals develop MDD in response to stress. That is, the life stress 
literature tells us that some individuals (e.g., persons with GAD) are at a greater risk of 
developing MDD as a result of stress, and the literature on anhedonia tells us that deficits 
in hedonic capacity are relevant to the development of depression. Might be it be the case 
that for certain individuals stress leads to more pronounced drops in hedonic capacity, 
rendering these individuals more vulnerable to developing a full blown depressive 
episode?  Such a model offers a theoretical framework for testing hypotheses about a 
potential pathway from GAD to depression. Specifically, individuals with GAD may be 
especially vulnerable to future depression because they are especially susceptible to 
pronounced stress-induced hedonic deficits.  
 
Studying Hedonic Capacity in the Laboratory 
  Recent methodological advances allow for improved experimental manipulation 
and assessment of hedonic capacity (e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Researchers have begun 
to utilize behavioral measures of anhedonia, or reduced reward responsiveness. 
Behavioral anhedonia paradigms often include a task where some sort of reward is 
offered and the response to the reward or sensitivity to the reward is indexed. These 
behavioral anhedonia measures have been shown to distinguish depressed from healthy 
individuals as well as predict future depression. Both dysphoric individuals (Henriques, 
Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994; Pizzagalli et al., 2005) and individuals with MDD 
(Henriques & Davidson, 2000) show a decreased response bias toward reward on 
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laboratory tasks when compared to healthy controls, a pattern that cannot be explained by 
depression-related differences in task performance (e.g., accuracy; Pizzagalli et al., 2005; 
2009). Importantly, reduced reward responding has been shown to predict greater levels 
of depression symptoms one month later (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Depressed children 
show similar alterations in reward response, which are also predictive of future 
depression (Forbes, Shaw, & Dahl, 2007). Finally, behavioral anhedonia paradigms also 
distinguish individuals with enhanced reward responsiveness from controls. Barr et al. 
(2008) found that individuals who were administered nicotine, a drug that affects brain 
reward centers, showed significantly greater reward responsiveness than controls. 
Laboratory probes of anhedonia, therefore, appear to be well-suited to study hedonic 
capacity experimentally, as well as the individual differences that might exist between 
groups of healthy and at-risk individuals. 
 
Laboratory Investigations of Stress and Hedonic Capacity 
Recently, Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) used a behavioral measure of anhedonia 
and found that lab-induced stress leads to reduced hedonic capacity. Specifically, healthy 
female participants showed decreased hedonic capacity under laboratory induced stress 
when compared to a no-stress condition. Because the present study draws upon the 
Bogdan and Pizzagalli design, the methodology and findings of Bogdan and Pizzagalli 
(2006) are reviewed in some detail. 
Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) operationalized hedonic capacity by using a signal 
detection task to index response bias toward reward. Signal detection tasks have been 
previously used as implicit tests of response bias toward reward (e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 
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2005) to objectively measure individuals’ propensity to change response patterns based 
on the presence of reward. Detection theory suggests that if one correct response is 
rewarded more often than another, people will begin to prefer that stimulus over the one 
that is less often rewarded (i.e., they develop a response bias; Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991). Response patterns of individuals high in reward responsiveness demonstrate their 
ability to modulate behavior in order to maximize reward. Alternatively, individuals low 
in reward response (i.e., anhedonia) will not effectively modulate behavior to maximize 
reward. The use of response bias on a signal detection task to measure reward response 
thus potentially represents an “objective, laboratory-based measure of hedonic capacity” 
(Pizzagalli et al., 2005, p.320).  
In a healthy female sample, Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) induced stress in two 
experimental conditions and then used a signal detection task to measure response bias. 
In one stressor condition, participants performed the signal detection task under shock 
threat via two electrodes placed on their necks. While participants performed the 
computer-based signal detection task, an indicator on the computer screen displayed the 
likelihood that they would receive shock, ostensibly as a result of their performance on 
the task. Individuals in the control condition always saw a very low likelihood while 
individuals in the stress condition saw fluctuating higher levels of likelihood of shock. 
Individuals in the shock threat condition showed a significant reduction in response bias 
on the signal detection task compared to controls, although there were no differences in 
discriminability (i.e., the stressor did not just make them perform poorer on the task in 
general). In the other stressor condition, individuals received feedback on their 
performance on the signal detection task via an indicator on the computer screen. The 
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indicator displayed feedback as to the individuals’ performance compared to previous 
participants (i.e., ranging from “poor” to “superior”). The decreases in reward response 
due to negative feedback did not reach statistical significance, which the authors 
conjectured may be a result of this stressor not producing the necessary level of anxiety 
and negative affect that, when “coupled with the evaluative aspects of the stressor may be 
required to induce hedonic deficits” (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006, p. 1152). Overall, 
Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) showed that healthy individuals experience hedonic 
deficits as a result of stress and provided an innovative design and methodology to probe 
such effects in at-risk individuals.  
 
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to test a model where at-risk individuals experience 
enhanced deficits in hedonic capacity as a result of stress. Previous evidence suggests that 
stress can lead to depression, that individuals with GAD are at greater risk of developing 
depression as a result of stress, and that stress leads to reduced hedonic capacity, which 
has been implicated in the etiology of depression. This study extended previous work by 
Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) and examined individual differences in the effects of stress 
on hedonic capacity in healthy individuals and individuals with GAD. To our knowledge, 
this was the first study to examine the impact of stress on hedonic capacity in a group at 
elevated risk for developing depressive symptoms.  
The central study aim was to test whether individuals with GAD exhibit greater 
stress-induced hedonic deficits than control individuals. To reduce the potential confound 
of current depression on reward responding, the study excluded cases reporting a current 
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depression diagnosis. Further, data on the MDD history of each participant was collected 
to test for effects of past depression on stress-induced anhedonia, as past depressive 
episodes themselves can influence the effects of stress on depressive symptoms (Kessler, 
1997). Given that gender has been found to interact with risk factors for depression 
including stress, neuroticism, and GAD (e.g., Hettema et al., 2006; Kendler et al., 2004), 
female participants were the focus here to simplify our modeling. We expected stress-
induced reductions in hedonic capacity in the control group, and that this effect would be 
larger in the GAD group. Secondary analyses of neuroticism as a potential mediator of 
these effects were planned, as neuroticism is a shared vulnerability factor for both anxiety 
and depression and because it has been shown to moderate the effects of stress on 
depression in naturalistic studies (Hutchinson & Williams, 2007; Kendler et al., 2004). 
Finally, participants were followed over one month and reassessed on levels of 
depression symptoms to permit prospective analyses. Based on previous work that 
hedonic deficits predict higher anhedonia levels one month later (Pizzagalli et al., 2005), 
it was expected that reductions in hedonic capacity in the stress condition would predict 
elevated anhedonia and depressive symptoms prospectively in both groups, with the 
GAD group showing a stronger predictive effect. To achieve this aim, a behavioral 
measure of anhedonia was acquired from an analog GAD group and control participants 
during a baseline no-stress condition as well as in a stress condition (order 
counterbalanced). Behavioral anhedonia was indexed by participants’ ability to modulate 
responses to maximize reward (i.e., response bias) on a signal detection task 
incorporating tangible reward for correct responses (used in Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006, 
Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Pizzagalli et al., 2007; Tripp & Alsop, 1999). The signal detection 
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task was presented in three blocks of 100 trials. The study was essentially a 2 x 2 x 3 
factorial design with group (control, GAD) as a between-subjects factor and condition 
(no stress, stress) and block (1, 2, 3) as within subjects repeating factors. Hedonic 
capacity (as indexed by response bias on the signal detection task) was the dependent 
variable. Finally, stress-induced behavioral anhedonia was investigated as a predictor of 
prospective depression symptoms (particularly anhedonia) and anxiety symptoms, 
measured at a one month follow-up session.  
 
Hypotheses 
H1 = In the control group, exposure to stress will lead to a decrease in hedonic capacity 
as measured by response bias on the signal detection task (See Figure 1). 
 
H2 = Compared to controls, individuals in the worry/GAD group will exhibit greater 
hedonic deficits as a result of stress. Therefore, the worry/GAD group will exhibit a 
greater reduction in response bias during stress than the control group (See Figure 1). 
 
H3 = Stress-induced hedonic deficits will predict elevated levels of depression and 
anhedonia symptoms one month later. This effect will be seen in both groups, with the 
worry/GAD group showing an enhanced effect compared with controls. Prospective 
anxiety symptoms will also be investigated as an exploratory outcome variable. 
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Figure 1. Expected results for hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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Method 
Overview 
The study consisted of three sequential phases: an online recruiting phase, a 
laboratory phase, and a follow up phase. Based on questionnaire responses in the online 
recruiting phase, potentially eligible participants were invited to participate in the 
laboratory session. At the lab session, participants were further screened for eligibility 
using self-report measures, and those who met criteria for participation completed the 
experimental protocol the dependent variables were measured in both control and 
experimental conditions. Participants who completed the lab session were invited to 
participate in a one-month follow up consisting of self-report measures. Follow up 
measures were completed online or in the laboratory, depending on whether the follow up 
session occurred when online forms were available via the subject pool. 
 
Participants  
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate research participant pool at the 
University of South Florida. Initial online pre-screening ensured that all participants were 
female, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and reported no current diagnosis 
of depression, serious brain trauma, or other neurological illness. All individuals meeting 
pre-screen criteria were invited to participate in the online recruiting study for course 
credit. Participants were recruited via email based on their responses to questionnaire 
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measures of worry and depression symptoms, and were not informed of study eligibility 
criteria. Using cutoff scores established by previous studies (see Measures), participants 
reporting low levels of worry were recruited for the control group, and participants with 
high levels of worry were recruited for the GAD group. Participants with high levels of 
current depression symptoms were excluded. Eligible participants were asked to come to 
the laboratory session in exchange for course credit. 
One hundred twelve participants attended laboratory study sessions, which were 
conducted over a nine month period from January to October 2009. Participants were 
ages 18-47 (M = 20.81, SD= 4.80). Among participants were 36 freshman (32.1%), 34 
sophomores (30.4%), 23 juniors (20.5%), 16 seniors (14.3%), and 3 who responded 
“other” (2.7%). Reported ethnicity of the sample was 61.6% Caucasian (n=69), 12.5% 
Hispanic/Latino (n=14), 11.6% Black/African American (n=13), 8.9% Multi-racial 
(n=10), 3.6% Asian (n=4), <1% American Indian/Alaskan Native (n=1), and <1% 
Unknown or not reported (n=1). Participants were predominantly right-handed (92%). 
Thirty-four participants were excluded from analyses for various reasons (see Table 1), 
resulting in a final sample size of N=78. 
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Table 1. Participants excluded from analyses and reasons for exclusion 
 
Total  
N = 112 
n excluded Reason for exclusion Number excluded by group 
N = 93 19 Midrange worry scores (PSWQ 46-55)  
N = 92 1 Inconsistent scores on PSWQ/GAD-Q  
   Worry/GAD 
(n=48/30) 
Control 
(n=44) 
N = 90 2 Meets current MDD criteria (IDD) 2/2  
N = 89 1 Incomplete data (technical difficulties) 1/1  
N = 89 1 <50% overall accuracy 1/1  
N = 79 9 Received <20 rewards in any block 5/4 4 
N = 78 1 Outlier: response bias z-score >4   1 
Final  
N = 78 
  Final 
n=39/22 
Final 
n=39 
 
 
Measures  
  Eligibility Measures for Study Group Inclusion.   
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990). The PSWQ is a 16 item measure of trait worry. A cutoff score of !56 was used to 
recruit participants for the GAD group. This score yields 90% sensitivity and 75% 
specificity in identifying GAD cases (diagnosed by the GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) 
in a college sample (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003). A cutoff score of " 45 
was used to identify control participants. This cutoff score falls at the 50th percentile in a 
community sample and reflects 98% specificity in identifying individuals with GAD 
(Behar et al., 2003), which means the controls recruited for the present study were 
unlikely to have significant GAD symptoms. The PSWQ was readministered at the lab 
session. Participants were excluded if they no longer met PSWQ eligibility criteria (i.e., 
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PSWQ scores fell in the mid-range of worry scores (between 45 and 56), precluding 
inclusion in the control or GAD group. The PSWQ had acceptable reliability in this 
sample (# = .73).  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 
2002). The GAD-Q is a 9 item paper-and-pencil diagnostic measure for current 
generalized anxiety disorder. The authors recommend a dimensional scoring system of 0-
13 with a cutoff of 5.7 yielding 83% sensitivity and 89% specificity in identifying GAD 
cases (as diagnosed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule; Brown, DiNardo, & 
Barlow, 1994). This method has been previously used to identify college students with 
analog GAD (Miranda & Mennin, 2007; Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & 
Mennin, 2006). Turk et al. (2005) found that the 5.7 cutoff led to 33% of an unselected 
sample meeting criteria for analog GAD. In Salters-Pedneault et al. (2006), 26% of an 
unselected sample met criteria for analog GAD (31% of females—59 out of 190—met 
criteria). The GAD-Q was reliable in this sample (# = .743). The current study used the 
5.7 cutoff to identify research analog cases of GAD. In addition, inclusion in the GAD 
group required participants to score consistently on the GAD-Q and the PSWQ, that is, to 
also have high worry scores (PSWQ scores !56) at the time of the lab session.  
Thirty participants initially met criteria for the GAD group, using the 5.7 cutoff 
on the GAD-Q diagnostic measure. Because prior analog GAD research has also been 
conducted using the PSWQ instrument, hypotheses were also tested also in the larger 
group of high worriers selected by the PSWQ. Forty-eight participants met initial criteria 
for the worry group utilizing the !56 cutoff score on the PSWQ as criteria for inclusion. 
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Pervasive worry is the cardinal feature of GAD, so the group selected by the PSWQ is 
conceptually similar to the group selected by the GAD-Q.   
  Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II 
was used primarily to screen out individuals with very high levels of current depression 
symptoms. The BDI-II is a well-validated 21-item self-administered scale of depression 
symptom severity. Scores range from 0 to 63 with higher scores representing more 
severity.  Coefficient alphas for the BDI-II are high in previous studies (# = .91; Beck, 
Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) and in the current sample (# = .90).  The test-retest 
reliability is also high (r = .93; Beck et al., 1996).  The BDI-II measures depressive 
symptoms during the last two weeks. As recommended by Dozois, Dobson, and Ahnberg 
(1998), we utilized a cutoff score of <20 to screen out potentially high levels of dysphoria 
or clinical depression during the online phase. The BDI-II was readministered at the lab 
session, and we included cases with scores higher than the recruiting threshold (!20) only 
if these cases did not meet diagnostic criteria for MDD (see IDD below). 
  Inventory to Diagnose Depression (IDD; Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987a). The 
IDD is a 22 item self-report measure to diagnose major depressive disorder. In a college 
sample, it demonstrates 70% sensitivity and 87.5% specificity in identifying depression 
cases diagnosed via a structured clinical interview (Goldston, O'Hara, & Schartz, 1990). 
The IDD was reliable in this sample (# = .84). The IDD was used in the present study as a 
second tier of screening to exclude participants who likely had case-level depression. 
Participants who met IDD criteria for a current depressive episode were excused from 
further data collection. The IDD also generates a continuous symptom score (range 0-88) 
with high scores representing higher current depression symptom severity. 
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  Other Lab Session Measures. 
  Demographics and Health Questionnaire. Participants completed a questionnaire 
targeting demographic information (e.g., age, gender) and health inclusion criteria (e.g., 
brain trauma, normal vision). 
  Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  The BAI 
is a 21-item self-administered questionnaire of anxiety symptoms during the past week. 
In the present study, instructions were altered to assess anxiety symptoms over the past 
two weeks to facilitate comparison with the BDI-II. Symptoms were rated on a four-point 
scale, with higher scores indicating more severe anxiety symptoms.  Previous studies 
show the internal consistency of the BAI is high (# = .92), and the BAI correlates highly 
with the SCL-90-R Anxiety Subscale (r = .81) (Steer, Ranieri, Beck, & Clark, 1993). The 
BAI demonstrated excellent reliability in this sample (# = .92). 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al., 1995). The 
MASQ is a 90 item measure of depression and anxiety symptoms which was designed in 
line with the tripartite model of anxiety and depression. The MASQ assesses symptoms 
over the past week and has several subscales assessing general distress - mixed symptoms 
(MASQ-GDM), general distress - anxious symptoms (MASQ-GDA), general distress - 
depressive symptoms (MASQ-GDD), anxious arousal (MASQ-AA), and anhedonic 
depression (MASQ-AD). It has sound psychometric properties (Keogh & Reidy, 2000; 
Watson et al., 1995), and demonstrated good reliability in this sample (# = .88). 
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Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime (IDD-L; Zimmerman & Coryell, 
1987b). The IDD-L is the lifetime version of the IDD and was used to determine whether 
or not each participant had a past history of major depression (see secondary analyses). 
Internal consistency was excellent in the current sample (# = .91). 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). The PSS 
is a widely used 14 item self-report measure of perceived life stress during the last month. 
The PSS has previously shown strong psychometric properties in samples of college 
students (Cohen et al., 1983), and showed good reliability in this sample (# = .86). 
 
  State Affect Measures for Stressor Manipulation.  
State Trait Anxiety Inventory, State version (STAI-S; Spielberger et al., 1983). 
The STAI-S is a 20 item self-report measure of anxiety symptoms experienced at the 
present moment. An abbreviated form was used in the present study, including only the 
10 STAI state items from Spielberger’s State Trait Personality Inventory (STPI, 
Spielberger et al., 1979). This scale demonstrated good reliability in the current sample (# 
= .90). 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-State Instructions (PANAS-S; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS-S is a 20 item self-report measure of positive and 
negative affect experienced at the present moment. This measure has demonstrated 
excellent psychometric properties in previous samples and is a valid measure of the two 
independent constructs of positive and negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). Reliability in 
the current sample was excellent for PA (# = .90) and good for NA (# = .79). 
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Self Assessment Manikin-Arousal (SAM-A; Bradley & Lang, 1994). The SAM-
A is a paper-and-pencil picture-based scale that depicts 5 figures ranging from unaroused 
to extremely aroused. Responders choose between 9 responses (one for each picture and 
one in between each picture) to indicate which of the figures best represents their current 
level of arousal.    
  Anticipatory Anxiety Rating. During the computer task, single item assessments 
of anticipatory anxiety were administered to assess participants’ level of anticipatory 
anxiety about completing the upcoming math task. Participants were presented with a 
visual scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely) and asked to respond by 
keystroke to the question, “How ANXIOUS are you about the upcoming math task? 
Using the scale below, type the number on the keyboard that describes how anxious you 
feel right now.”  Ratings were made following reminder prompts at each 30 second break 
between trial blocks, totaling two ratings per condition. 
 
  Stressor Task Appraisal Measure. 
  Math Task Appraisal Questionnaire. This questionnaire consists of 8 items 
assessing participants’ perceptions and feelings about the impending math task. The 
questionnaire is modeled closely after the appraisal measure used by Tomaka, 
Blascovich, and colleagues (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993; see also 
Kelsey et al., 2000; Salomon, Clift, Karlsdottir, & Rottenberg, 2009 for more recent 
adaptations).  
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  Trait Measures. 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait version, form Y (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 
1983). The STAI-T is a widely used measure of trait anxiety symptoms. Responders 
answer 20 items assessing anxiety symptoms in terms of how they generally feel. The 
STAI-T has excellent psychometric properties and demonstrates convergent validity with 
other indices of anxiety symptoms. The STAI-T demonstrated excellent reliability in this 
sample (# = .93). 
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard, Gard, Kring, & John, 
2006). The TEPS is an 18 item self-report measure of anticipatory and consummatory 
pleasure. The TEPS demonstrates adequate internal consistency, good test-retest 
reliability, and convergent validity with other anhedonia measures (Gard et al., 2006). In 
the current sample, the TEPS demonstrated adequate internal consistency (# = .76).  
 NEO-PI-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-PI-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). The 
NEO-PI-FFI is a widely used 60 item measure of personality including indices of 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The NEO-PI-
FFI shows solid psychometric properties in samples of adolescents and college students 
(McCrae & Costa, 2004). The current study utilized the neuroticism (NEO-N) and 
extraversion (NEO-E) subscales, which demonstrated good reliability in the current 
sample (# = .85 and .77, respectively).  
 Behavioral Inhibition/ Activation System Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 
1994).  The BIS/ BAS is a 24 item self-report measure of behavioral approach (BAS) and 
inhibition (BIS) tendencies. The BIS/BAS scale has shown adequate reliability in 
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previous samples (Carver & White, 1994), and both BIS and BAS subscales 
demonstrated good reliability in the current sample (# = .82 and.81, respectively).  
   Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Trait Instructions (PANAS-T; Watson et 
al., 1988). The PANAS-T is a 20 item self-report scale measuring dispositional forms of 
positive and negative affect (Watson et al., 1988).  The PANAS has successfully 
differentiated depression and anxiety in clinical samples (Dyck, Jolly, & Kramer, 1994; 
Jolly, Dyck, Kramer, & Wherry, 1994).  The PANAS is also highly reliable, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89 for positive affect and .85 for negative affect (Crawford & 
Henry, 2004). In the current study, both PA and NA demonstrated high reliability (# = 
.88 and .88, respectively). 
 
  Behavioral Measure of Hedonic Capacity. 
Signal Detection Task. A signal detection task was used to index participants’ 
ability to modulate responses based on reward, or reward responsiveness (Pizzagalli et 
al., 2005). As in prior studies (e.g., Bogdon & Pizzagalli, 2006; Pizzagalli et al., 2005; 
Tripp & Alsop, 1999), this method involved briefly presenting one of two stimulus types 
(e.g., a short line and long line) and asking participants to respond as to which of the two 
stimuli were seen. The two stimulus types were presented equally often. Only some 
correct responses were followed by a monetary reward (5 cents)—one stimulus type (e.g., 
either the short line or the long line) was scheduled to be rewarded for correct responses 
three times as often as the other stimulus. Creating an unbalanced reward schedule 
between the two types of correct responses produces a systematic preference—or 
response bias—for the stimuli that is most often followed by the reward (Macmillan & 
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Creelman, 1991). Conceptually, individuals with higher reward responsiveness exhibit 
more of a response bias because they modulate their responses to increase the chances of 
receiving the reward (i.e., they will more often report seeing the stimulus that is more 
frequently paired with a reward). Individuals with lower reward responsiveness do not 
exhibit the same response bias, but will perform adequately on the task (Pizzagalli et al., 
2005; Tripp & Alsop, 1999). Response bias on the signal detection task, therefore, was a 
behavioral measure of reward responsiveness, or hedonic capacity.  
  The method for this study drew heavily upon Tripp and Alsop (1999), Pizzagalli 
et al. (2005), and Bogdon and Pizzagalli (2006). The signal detection task was presented 
on a PC via E-prime software (version 2.0, Psychological Software Tools, Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA). The task included 3 blocks of 100 trials, which were separated by 30 
second breaks. Because participants completed the signal detection task twice (once in a 
no stress condition and once in a stress condition), two target types were used (nose or 
mouth on a schematic face) and were counterbalanced across group and condition to 
minimize carry-over effects (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006).  
 Each trial began with a fixation point at the middle of the screen for 1 second. The 
fixation point was then replaced with a schematic representation of a face that was 
missing a feature (without a nose or a mouth) for 500ms. The missing feature then 
appeared either as a long version  (13 mm for mouths; 6.5 mm for noses) or a short 
version  (12 mm for mouths; 6 mm for noses) for 100ms and then disappears again, 
leaving the mouthless or noseless face on the screen for 1500 ms. The participant then 
responded as to whether it was the long or short stimulus that was presented on the face 
by pressing either the ‘z’ or ‘m’ key (counterbalanced across participants). Participants 
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were instructed to keep their index fingers on the z and m keys throughout the task, and 
the keys were marked with brightly colored stickers to aid in this. Short and long stimuli 
were presented equally often in a quasi-randomized order— such that neither version was 
presented more than 3 times in a row. Participants were instructed that not all of the 
correct identifications would be followed by a reward. Indeed, only 40 correct 
identifications were followed by a reward. If a participant identified a stimulus correctly 
and a reward was scheduled, the phrase “Correct!! You won 5 cents!” was presented in 
the center of the screen for 1500ms and followed by a blank screen for 250ms. If the 
correct identification was not scheduled to receive reward, no feedback was given and the 
screen was blank for 1750ms. Figure 2 shows a schematic of a trial with consecutive 
screens and the length of time they are seen in a trial where a reward is given for correct 
identification of a mouth (modified from Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006, p. 1148). 
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Figure 2. Trial schematic 
 
As previously stated, creating the necessary conditions for response bias to occur 
requires scheduling the two versions of the target stimuli (short and long) to be 
differentially rewarded (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). The version scheduled to be 
rewarded most often (30 out of 40 trials) is referred to as the “rich” stimulus, and the 
version associated with reward less often (10 out of 40 trials) is the “lean” stimulus. The 
assignment of each stimulus to be “rich” or “lean” was counterbalanced across condition 
so that each participant encountered both long and short versions of the stimuli as the 
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“rich” stimulus. Importantly, we diverged from previous studies in not using a controlled 
reinforcer procedure, or missed reward replacement. That is, previous studies attempted 
to control the 3:1 ratio of rich rewards versus lean rewards by replacing scheduled reward 
trials if the participant did not provide the correct response and receive the scheduled 
reward (i.e., offering additional reward opportunities until a fixed ratio of received 
rewards was met). The current study controlled only the potential for receiving 3 rich 
rewards for every 1 lean reward. The advantage of our design is that the participant’s 
reward ratio was contingent upon her own performance, allowing for individual variation 
in the exact ratio of rich to lean rewards, and serving as a more stringent test of response 
bias hypotheses.   
 
Procedure 
  Overview. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants provided written consent, 
including consent to be videotaped and consent to be contacted for follow up study 
participation. Participants completed the Demographics and Health Questionnaire, GAD-
Q, IDD, IDD-L, and BAI, and the PSWQ and BDI-II were re-administered. Participants 
who met diagnostic criteria for current major depression based on IDD responses were 
excused from further data collection. Participants then completed the behavioral measure 
of hedonic capacity in the stress and no stress conditions (counterbalanced), and were 
given monetary rewards earned directly after completing each computer task (the 
maximum compensation was $12 per participant). Participants then completed the 
BISBAS, PSS, STAI-T, TEPS, NEO-FFI, PANAS-T, and MASQ, and were compensated 
for participation with course credit.  
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  Experimental Protocol. All lab sessions were conducted by undergraduate or 
post- Bachelor’s level research assistants who were blind to participant group status. 
Research assistants attended an introductory training session with the principal 
investigator (~2 hrs), followed by a supervised practice session with another research 
assistant standing in as the participant. Research assistants were required to demonstrate 
mastery of experimental scripts and protocol administration including stressor task 
administration prior to data collection, and all first administrations were supervised by 
the principal investigator.  
  Participants were told that the study was examining “how anxiety affects task 
performance.” The signal detection task was referred to as a “computer task” and 
participants were told that the goal in the computer task was to win as much money as 
possible and that the best way to do this was to correctly identify as many stimuli as 
possible (as in Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006). To establish credibility, participants were 
shown six $1 bills they may win by performing well on the computer task. Participants 
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and were told to “please do your best” 
on the task because their ability to focus and perform well on the task was the focus of 
the study. Participants were told that not all of their correct responses would be rewarded. 
Participants received instructions on the signal detection task and completed 
sixteen practice trials to gain familiarity with the task. Participants were seated 
approximately 20 inches from the computer screen. Following the practice trials, the 
research assistant left the study room and all other instructions were delivered via 
intercom from an adjacent observation room. Participants then completed the signal 
detection task twice—once in a stress condition and once in a no stress condition 
  
32 
(counterbalanced). Between the stress and no stress conditions, participants traced 
geometric shapes for five minutes as a buffer task to decrease carry-over effects from the 
previous condition.  
Following Bogdan & Pizzagalli (2006), participants completed state affect 
measures (PANAS-S, STAI-S, and SAM-A) at baseline, pre-task, and post-task in each 
condition. Instructions on the post-task measures were altered to assess affect during the 
computer task. Additionally, participants made anticipatory anxiety ratings during breaks 
between computer task trial blocks.   
Stress Condition. To extend prior work, the current study utilized a mental 
arithmetic task as the experimental stress condition.  Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) found 
that shock threat had effects on reward responsiveness, but a negative performance 
feedback condition did not. Threat of shock is a highly arousing stressor which was also 
tied to performance on the signal detection task within their design. Bogdan and 
Pizzagalli (2006) speculated that receiving negative feedback was not successful in 
inducing decrements in reward responsiveness because it did not sufficiently involve 
elements of anxious arousal and social evaluation. Therefore, we selected a mental 
arithmetic task as the stressor because it is more ecologically valid than shock threat and 
involves elements of both social evaluation and anxious arousal. Indeed, mental 
arithmetic has been shown to elicit similar levels of anxious arousal to a shock stressor 
(Noteboom, 2001). 
Participants completed baseline state measures. They then received instructions 
via intercom and performed mental arithmetic task for 3 minutes. The task involved serial 
subtraction by 7s from 3,796. Participants were told to face the video camera, and that 
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they would be observed but not videotaped during the task. Participants were told to 
perform the task as quickly and accurately as possible. Errors were monitored by the 
experimenter and announced to the participant with instructions to begin again at the 
correct subtraction total. Participants were also prompted to “Please work quickly,” if 
they did not produce a complete answer in 3 seconds. Participants were told to “Please 
work faster,” 90 seconds or mid-way through the task. Participants were prompted to 
“Look into the camera,” if looking away, and were not allowed to use fingers to count. 
After 3 minutes, participants were told that they would next perform the computer task, 
followed by performing a more difficult version of the math task (subtracting 13 instead 
of 7), which would be videotaped and evaluated for speed, accuracy, and poise (as in 
Kelsey et al., 2000). Previous work has found that the addition of a second, subsequent 
videotaped mental arithmetic task increases participants’ subjective ratings of the 
stressfulness of the task (Kelsey et al., 2000). Participants completed pre-task state 
measures and the task appraisal measure, and then performed the computer task. After the 
first block of 100 trials, during the 30 second break, a black bold font message appeared 
on a bright yellow computer screen saying,  
“You have just completed the first 100 trials of this task. There are 200 trials 
remaining before you begin the *MORE DIFFICULT MATH TASK * that will be 
VIDEOTAPED and EVALUATED. Please continue to do your best on this task.”  
Then, a black screen appeared requesting participants to respond by key press to the 
anticipatory anxiety rating. Similarly, a message appeared after the second block of 100 
trials referring to 200 completed trials and 100 remaining to complete, followed by 
another anticipatory anxiety rating. The purpose of these prompts was to remind 
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participants of the impending stressor and to maintain and assess anticipatory anxiety 
throughout the computer task. After completing the third block of trials, participants 
completed post-task state measures. Participants then performed the more difficult mental 
math task (subtracting 13s). Because anticipatory anxiety was the variable of interest and 
the math task functioned only at this point to retain credibility for future tasks, 
participants were not prompted as frequently to work quickly during the task or to look 
into the camera, and the task only lasted one minute.  
No Stress Condition. Participants completed paper-and-pencil arithmetic 
problems of similar difficulty to those used in the stress condition for 3 minutes. 
Participants were informed that their responses would not be graded for accuracy. This 
type of control condition has been used in previous studies employing a mental arithmetic 
stressor (e.g., Domes, Heinrichs, Reichwald, & Hautzinger, et al., 2002). The intention of 
the task was to control for cognitive load (i.e., it is not a relaxation task) and distraction 
(i.e., it provides distraction from rumination upon previous task performance or worry 
about future performance) without purposely or systematically evoking a particular 
emotion. After 3 minutes, participants were told that they would next complete the 
computer task, followed by performing more paper-and-pencil arithmetic again without 
evaluation. Participants then completed pre-task measures and the task appraisal measure, 
and then performed the computer task. After the first block of 100 trials, during the 30 
second break, a black bold font message appeared on a yellow computer screen saying,  
“You have just completed the first 100 trials of this task. There are 200 trials 
remaining before you do written math again. Please continue to do your best on 
this task.”   
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Then participants were asked to make an anticipatory anxiety rating. A similar reminder 
message appeared after the second block of 100 trials, which referred to the 200 
completed trials and 100 remaining, followed by another anticipatory anxiety rating. 
After completing the third block of trials, participants completed post-task measures. 
Participants then began the pencil and paper arithmetic problems and continued for 1 
minute with no evaluation. Response bias during the no stress condition was used as a 
baseline measure of reward responsiveness for each participant. The lab visit lasted 
approximately 2.5 hours. One participant did not complete the experimental portion of 
the protocol due to technical difficulties. See Figure 3 for a laboratory protocol example 
in descending chronology for a participant in the no-stress condition first and stress 
condition second. 
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Figure 3. Laboratory study protocol  
 
  Follow Up Study. Participants were contacted via email one month following 
their participation in the lab session and invited to participate in a second online session 
for course credit. If the follow up session was scheduled to occur outside the period when 
online data collection was available, participants completed paper-and-pencil measures in 
 
• Initial Laboratory Protocol 
o Demographic, diagnostic and symptom measures 
o Instructions and practice with computer task 
• No Stress condition 
o No stress condition Baseline state measures 
o No stress math task (written math- 3 min.) 
o Instructions to anticipate doing written math again after computer task 
o Pre-task State measures and measure of task appraisal  
o Computer task (20-30 min.) 
! Single item anxiety rating after each block of trials  
o Post-task State measures  
o Monetary compensation  
o Written math (1 min.)  
• Buffer task  
o Shape tracing (5 min.) 
• Stress condition 
o Stress condition Baseline State measures 
o Stress math task (mental math- 3min.) 
o Instructions to anticipate doing more difficult math task with videotape 
after computer task 
o Pre-task State measures and measure of task appraisal  
o Computer task (20-30 min.) 
! Single item anxiety rating after each block of trials 
o Post-task State measures  
o Monetary compensation 
o Mental math (1 min.) 
• Self-report measures (20-30 min) 
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the laboratory for $10 cash compensation. This follow-up session involved completion of 
the following measures: the GAD-Q, IDD, BAI, BDI-II, STAI, TEPS, PSWQ, PANAS, 
MASQ, and PSS. Participants were debriefed via email following follow up study 
participation.  
 
Data Reduction 
 Deleted Trials. Consistent with previous studies utilizing the signal detection 
paradigm (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006), trials with reaction times <150 ms or >1500 ms 
were excluded. Trials with incorrect key presses were also excluded with one exception: 
If a participant consistently pressed a neighboring key (i.e., “x” instead of z for several 
trials, where the intention of the key press was clear) and the trials were NOT scheduled 
to receive a reward (i.e., the person would not have been rewarded even if z had been 
pressed), the trials were counted as correct responses for the purposes of accuracy. Any 
incorrect key presses that were random or occurred in a trial scheduled to receive a 
reward were excluded. The total number of deleted trials per participants for any reason 
ranged from 0 to 42 (M=4.64, SD = 6.77). 
 Excluded Cases. Consistent with prior work (Barr et al., 2008), participants were 
excluded for performing at less than chance accuracy rates (<50% accuracy). To ensure 
that included participants received adequate numbers of rewards to create the desired 
reward differential in each block of trials, participants receiving fewer than 20 of 40 
(50%) potential rewards in any one block were excluded from analyses. Although this 
lower limit is more liberal than that reported in a previous study (30 out of 40 in each 
block; Barr et al., 2008), it was conservative enough to exclude participants who 1) 
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missed a great deal of trials in one or more blocks, 2) used a “strategy” like pressing the 
same key for most trials, or 3) performed well in one condition and at chance levels in 
other condition (i.e., where combined accuracy may have been slightly greater than 
chance).  
  Response Bias and Discriminability Calculations. Response bias and 
discriminability were calculated following past work using this task (e.g., Bogdan & 
Pizzagalli, 2006).  Calculation formulas were derived from signal detection theory 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). For clarity, components of the formulas are defined 
below in both traditional signal detection terms (e.g., hits, misses) and in terms specific to 
the task in this study: 
H = Hits = Correct identification of the rich stimulus (rich = rewarded more often) 
F = False alarms = Choosing the rich stimulus when the lean stimulus was 
presented 
M = Misses = Choosing the lean stimulus when the rich stimulus was presented  
C = Correct Rejections = Correct identification of the lean stimulus  
Response bias in the present context is defined as the tendency to systematically prefer 
the rich stimulus over the lean stimulus. It is represented by the following formula: 
  Response bias: log b = $(H * F / M * CR) 
Discriminability refers to the ability to discriminate between the two stimuli and 
measures overall performance. In the present context, discriminability measures will be 
used to test for specificity of findings about the effects of stress on response bias. That is, 
by demonstrating that stress does not affect overall task performance but does affect 
response bias, one can infer that the effect of stress is specific to response bias. 
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Discriminability: log d = $(H * CR / M * FA) 
  Following previous work, 0.5 was added to each cell of the decision matrix to 
allow for calculations where the cells contain zeros (see Pizzagalli et al., 2007).  
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Overview of Analyses 
Stress Manipulation Analyses 
  Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) tested for significant stress 
manipulation effects on each dependent measure of self-reported state anxiety, negative 
affect (NA), positive affect (PA), and arousal (STAI-S, PANAS-S-NA, PANAS-S-PA, 
SAM-A) using Group (control, worry) as a between subjects factor and Condition (no 
stress, stress) and Time (baseline, pre-task, post-task) as repeated within subjects factors. 
A successful stressor manipulation would be indicated by a Condition x Time interaction, 
which would be decomposed using follow up contrasts and graph inspection. Scores on 
the PANAS-S-NA, STAI-S, SAM-A were expected to increase from baseline to pre-task 
(and to decrease on the PANAS-S-PA) to a greater degree in the stress condition than in 
the no stress condition (although Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006, did not find significant 
reductions in PA in the stress conditions). Similar analyses were planned examining 
stressor effects on task appraisal (MTAQ) and Anticipatory Anxiety Ratings taken during 
the computer task.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
H1 = In the control group, exposure to stress will lead to a decrease in hedonic capacity 
as measured by response bias on the signal detection task. 
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Using data from the control group only, a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with Condition (no stress, stress) and Block (1, 2, 3) as within subjects factors 
was planned to test for a main effect of Condition (no stress, stress) on response bias. 
Alpha was set at p<.05 a priori. A main effect of Condition (no stress, stress) in the 
hypothesized direction would indicate that the stress condition was associated with 
significantly lower response bias scores than the control condition. Planned comparisons 
were used to test for the expected increases in response bias across blocks. 
 
H2 = Compared to controls, individuals in the worry/GAD group will exhibit greater 
hedonic deficits as a result of stress. Therefore, the worry/GAD group will exhibit a 
greater reduction in response bias during stress than the control group. 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Group (control, 
worry/GAD) as a between subjects factor and Condition (no stress, stress) and Block (1, 
2, 3) as within subjects factors was planned to test for an interaction of Group (between 
subjects) and Condition (within subjects) on response bias. A significant interaction 
would be followed up by planned contrasts to determine whether the worry/GAD group 
exhibited significantly lower response bias scores in the stress condition compared to 
controls. Planned contrasts were used to test for the expected increases in response bias 
across blocks. 
 
H3 = Stress-induced hedonic deficits will predict elevated levels of depression and 
anhedonia symptoms one month later. This effect will be seen in both groups, with the 
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worry/GAD group showing an enhanced effect compared with controls. Prospective 
anxiety symptoms will also be investigated as an exploratory outcome variable. 
Correlation analyses were planned for each group separately to test whether mean 
response bias scores in the stress condition predicted follow-up depression, anhedonia, 
and anxiety scores. Significant relationships would be followed up by hierarchical 
regression analyses entering baseline symptoms into the regression model at step 1 and 
response bias under stress at step 2 to test for prediction of future symptoms beyond 
initial symptom levels. We expected that lower response bias in the stress condition 
would predict higher depression and anhedonia at one month follow-up in both groups. 
As a follow up, to test the hypothesis that the worry/GAD group might show an enhanced 
predictive effect compared to controls, the Chow test (Chow, 1960) was planned to 
statistically test the hypothesis that the two groups differed on the set of coefficients in 
the regression models. 
 
Discriminability, Accuracy, and Reaction Time Analyses 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were planned for discriminability and accuracy 
with Group (control, worry) as a between subjects factor, and Condition (no stress, stress) 
and Block (1, 2, 3) as repeating within subjects factors. Non-significant findings on these 
tests would help exclude the possibility that group differences in response bias were 
driven by group differences in discriminability and accuracy (i.e., if one group showed 
poor overall performance on the task). A similar test was performed with reaction time as 
the dependent variable. 
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Secondary Moderation Analyses 
Secondary analyses were planned to test for potential moderation of the 
relationship between condition and response bias in each group. Neuroticism, history of 
depression, and measures of life stress would be investigated as potential moderators. 
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Results 
Checking Model Assumptions and Assessing Outliers 
General Linear Model assumptions were evaluated for the main continuous 
outcome variable (response bias scores) separately for each condition. Initial visual 
inspection of histograms suggested normally distributed data in the stress condition, but 
slight positive skew in the no stress condition. Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality confirmed 
non-normality in the no stress condition (W = .948, p = .003), along with significant 
skewness and kurtosis values. Outlier analyses revealed one significant outlier (z-score > 
4) in the no stress condition. When this outlier was removed, the distribution normalized 
and skewness, kurtosis, and normality test statistics values were no longer significant. All 
further analyses were performed with this outlier omitted. The assumption of 
independence of observations was met as part of the design: the behavior and responses 
of each participant was independent of all others. The assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met based on nonsignificant Levene’s test statistics for dependent variable 
scores at all levels of the independent variables. Visual distribution inspection of all 
secondary dependent variables (accuracy, reaction time, discriminability) suggested 
normally distributed data. 
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Sample Characteristics 
  Data are presented for 39 controls and 39 high worry participants. Randomization 
to experimental condition was successful: control and worry groups did not differ in 
assignment to counter-balanced experimental protocols, Cramer’s V = .384, p = .118. 
Groups also did not differ on characteristics such as ethnicity, year in school, handedness, 
or age, all ps >.05. In the worry group, 22 met criteria for GAD according to the GAD-Q 
cutoff score. Worry group participants were more likely to meet criteria for a past episode 
of major depression according to the IDD-L (n=18) compared to controls (n=4), "2(1, 
N=78) = 12.41, p<.001. The worry group reported significantly higher current depression, 
anxiety, and anhedonia symptoms, as well as higher trait negative affect, neuroticism, and 
perceived stress, and lower trait positive affect (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Group differences in symptoms and trait variables 
 
Measure Control group Worry group    
 M SD M SD F  df p 
        
     PSWQ 35.51 5.25 64.08 6.14 487.86 1,76 <.001 
     BDI-II 4.67 3.88 13.26 7.57 39.82 1,76 <.001 
     BAI  5.67 4.58 16.39 12.03 27.01 1,75 <.001 
     GAD-Q total 
score 
0.90 1.05 6.58 2.85 138.03 1,76 <.001 
     IDD total score 16.62 12.86 32.67 19.08 32.36 1,76 <.001 
     MASQ-GDD 16.54 2.58 23.59 6.77 36.90 1,76 <.001 
     MASQ-GDA 14.49 2.83 22.71 6.22 56.67 1,76 <.001 
     MASQ-AA 20.26 5.50 26.49 8.58 14.59 1,76 <.001 
     MASQ-AD  46.44 11.60 60.08 13.26 23.29 1,76 <.001 
     PSS 18.21 5.34 26.56 5.96 42.48 1,76 <.001 
     TEPS total score 81.08 11.22 85.54 10.73 3.22 1,76 .077 
     TEPS-A 46.38 6.40 49.26 7.37 3.38 1,76 .070 
     TEPS-C 34.69 7.21 36.28 6.29 1.077 1,76 .303 
     PANAS-T-PA 35.59 7.32 31.21 5.85 8.541 1,76 .005 
     PANAS-T-NA 12.08 1.86 18.36 5.68 43.08 1,76 <.001 
     STAI-T 30.59 5.05 46.59 8.82 96.56 1,76 <.001 
     BIS 19.49 3.54 24.28 2.31 50.28 1,76 <.001 
     BAS  42.18 4.14 42.41 5.57 .043 1,76 .836 
     NEO-N 13.97 5.08 26.08 6.68 81.07 1,76 <.001 
     NEO-E 32.77 5.86 30.08 6.40 3.75 1,76 .056 
     NEO-C 35.49 6.64 35.38 6.62 .005 1,76 .946 
     NEO-O 29.85 6.16 30.41 5.58 .180 1,76 .673 
     NEO-A 33.33 6.70 32.71 6.10 .182 1,75 .671 
 
PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire, BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory, BAI: Beck 
Anxiety Inventory, GAD-Q total: Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire total 
score, IDD total score: Inventory to Diagnose Depression total score, MASQ: Mood and 
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, MASQ-GDD: MASQ General Distress Depression 
subscale score, MASQ-GDA: MASQ General Distress Anxiety subscale score, MASQ-
AA: MASQ Anxious Arousal subscale, MASQ-AD: MASQ Anhedonia subscale, PSS: 
Perceived Stress Scale, TEPS: Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale, TEPS-A: TEPS 
Anticipatory subscale, TEPS-C: TEPS Consummatory subscale, PANAS-T-PA: Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule, Trait Positive Affect scale, PANAS-T-NA: Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule, Trait Negative Affect scale, BIS: Behavioral Inhibition scale, 
BAS: Behavioral Activation scale, NEO-N: Neuroticism, NEO-E: Extraversion, NEO-C: 
Conscientiousness, NEO-O: Openness, NEO-A: Agreeableness. 
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Stress Manipulation Analyses 
  State Anxiety. Repeated measures analyses were performed for STAI-S scores to 
assess stressor manipulation effects on state anxiety reports. There were main effects for 
Condition, F (1, 75) = 30.22, p<.001, partial #2 = .287, and Time, F(2,150) = 64.376, 
p<.001, partial #2 = .462, qualified by a Condition x Time interaction, F(2,150) = 34.29, 
p<.001, #2 = .314, in which the stress condition generated greater increases in reported 
state anxiety than the no stress condition. In other words, our intended manipulation of 
state anxiety was successful. A main effect of Group, F(1, 75) = 53.67, p<.001, partial #2 
= .417, along with Group x Condition, F(1, 75) = 6.36, p = .014, partial #2 = .078, and 
Group x Time interactions, F(2, 150) = 3.35, p = .038, partial #2 = .043, show the worry 
group reported higher anxiety scores than controls overall in both conditions with more 
dramatic increases in anxiety that were especially apparent in the stress condition (see 
Figure 4a).  
 
Figure 4a. Stress manipulation effects on state anxiety 
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  Negative Affect. Analyses for NA revealed similar effects with main effects of 
Group, F(1, 75) = 43.33, p<.001, partial #2 = .366, Condition, F(1, 75) = 34.12, p<.001, 
partial #2 = .313, and Time, F(2, 150) = 33.05, p<.001, partial #2 = .306, qualified by 
interactions of Group x Condition, F(1, 75) = 8.08, p = .006, partial #2  = .097, and 
Group x Time, F(2, 150) = 6.88, p = .001), partial #2 = .084, Condition x Time, F(2, 150) 
= 37.90, p<.001, partial #2 = .336, and Group x Condition x Time, F(2, 150) = 6.39, p = 
.002, partial #2 = .079. Again, decomposition of the Condition x Time interaction 
indicated the stressor manipulation was successful in producing greater NA increases 
from baseline in the stress condition than the no stress condition. Again, the worry group 
reported a greater manipulation effect than the control group (see Figure 4b).  
 
Figure 4b. Stress manipulation effects on negative affect 
 
  Positive Affect. A main effect of Time, F(2, 148) = 35.76, p<.001, partial #2 = 
.326, qualified by a Condition x Time interaction, F(2, 148) = 3.49, p = .033, partial #2 = 
.045, indicated successful PA reduction in the stress condition, where reports of PA 
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decreased from baseline only in the stress condition for both groups. A significant main 
effect of Group, F(1, 74) = 7.76, p = .007, partial #2 = .095, indicated the worry group 
reported lower PA overall (see Figure 4c). 
 
Figure 4c. Stress manipulation effects on positive affect 
 
  Arousal. Analyses for arousal ratings indicated successful manipulation of 
arousal, with an effect of Time, F(2, 148) = 45.58, p = .001, partial #2 = .381, qualified 
by a Group x Condition x Time interaction, F(2, 148) = 3.93, p = .022, partial #2 = .050. 
Decomposition of the interaction indicated the stress condition generated larger arousal 
increases from baseline than the no stress condition in both groups. The worry group 
reported slightly larger increases from baseline in the stress condition, but this appears 
driven by group differences in baseline arousal ratings in the stress condition rather than 
differences in stress condition pre-task ratings (see Figure 4d). Thus, the stressor task was 
reported as more arousing than the no stress task for both groups. 
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Figure 4d. Stress manipulation effects on arousal 
 
Math Task Analyses – Appraisal, Anticipatory Anxiety, and Performance 
  Appraisal. Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for MTAQ items, with 
Condition (no stress, stress) as a within-subjects factor and Group as a between-subjects 
factor. Main effects of Condition indicated that participants appraised the stressor 
(mental) math task as significantly more demanding, stressful, and threatening than the 
no stress (written) math task, and participants reported feeling more nervous, less eager, 
less confident, less looking forward to the stressor math task than the no stress math task 
(see Table 3). Participants in the worry group found both math tasks more stressful and 
threatening, and reported feeling less eager, less confident, less looking forward to, and 
more nervous about both math tasks than controls. Groups did not differ on how 
demanding they found the task, suggesting that the math task were not simply more 
difficult for one group than the other. Interestingly, the item able to cope showed main 
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effects of Condition and Group, qualified by a Group x Condition interaction, F(1, 74) = 
14.64, p<.001, partial #2 = .165.  
Table 3. Group and condition effects on math task appraisal 
 
Appraisal item F df p partial #2 
Demanding     
     Condition 97.64 1,74 <.001 .569 
     Group .134 1,74 .715 .002 
Stressful     
     Condition 90.57 1,74 <.001 .550 
     Group 22.90 1,74 <.001 .236 
Threatening     
     Condition 81.35 1,74 <.001 .524 
     Group 10.90 1,74 <.001 .128 
Nervous     
     Condition 47.52 1,74 <.001 .391 
     Group 13.92 1,74 <.001 .158 
Eager     
     Condition 19.42 1,74 <.001 .208 
     Group 6.40 1,74 .014 .080 
Confident     
     Condition 95.08 1,74 <.001 .562 
     Group 15.65 1,74 <.001 .175 
Looking forward to     
     Condition 41.39 1,74 <.001 .359 
     Group 9.72 1,74 .003 .116 
Able to cope     
     Condition 53.34 1,74 <.001 .419 
     Group 36.89 1,74 <.001 .333 
 
  Post hoc Bonferroni corrected follow up tests revealed that while both groups 
reported feeling less able to cope in the stress versus no stress condition (ps<.01), the 
worry group reported feeling less able to cope than controls in the no stress condition, 
F(1, 75) = 12.57, p<.001), and stress conditions, F(1, 75) = 27.72, p<.001. Worry group 
participants reported significantly greater decreases in ability to cope (no stress: M = 
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4.32, SD = .78, stress: M = 3.05, SD = 1.18) in the stress condition than controls (no 
stress: M = 4.84, SD = .437, stress: M = 4.45, SD = .83). In sum, both groups appraised 
the stressor task more negatively than the no stress task, with the worry group reporting 
more negative appraisals overall. Interestingly, able to cope was the only appraisal item 
where the stressor condition had more dramatic appraisal effects for the worry group.   
 
  Anticipatory Anxiety. A repeated measures ANOVA was performed with Group 
as a between subjects factor and Condition and Time (1, 2) as repeating within-subjects 
factors. As Anticipatory ratings were only made during each condition (i.e., no baseline 
ratings were made), a main effect of Condition would indicate successful manipulation. 
Analyses revealed main effects of Condition, F(1, 76) = 48.86, p<.001, partial #2 = .391, 
and Group, F(1, 76) = 19.67, p<.001, partial #2 = .206, qualified by a significant Group x 
Condition interaction, F(1, 76) = 4.05, p = .048, partial #2 = .051. Anticipatory Anxiety 
ratings in the stress condition were higher for both groups than in the no stress condition, 
suggesting a successful manipulation of anticipatory anxiety. The lack of a significant 
Time effect suggested that the manipulation was successful at maintaining consistent 
anxiety levels throughout the computer task. The worry group had higher overall 
anticipatory anxiety, and larger increases in the stress condition than the control group 
(see Figures 4e and 4f). 
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Figure 4e. Stress manipulation effects on anticipatory anxiety in the no stress condition 
 
 
Figure 4f. Stress manipulation effects on anticipatory anxiety in the stress condition 
 
  Performance. One-way ANOVAs were performed to test for group differences in 
math task performance on the stressor mental math task occurring before the computer 
task (subtraction of 7s) and after the computer task (13s). Worry and control groups did 
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not differ in number of math problems attempted or correctly solved in either task, 
ps>.05.  
 
Cross-sectional Analyses 
  Hypothesis 1. In the control group, exposure to stress will lead to a decrease in 
hedonic capacity as measured by response bias on the signal detection task. 
Using data from the control group only, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed with Condition (no stress, stress) and Block (1, 2, 3) as within-subjects 
repeating factors to test for a main effect of Condition (no stress, stress) on response bias. 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the Condition main effect was significant, F(1, 38) = 4.43, 
p = .042, partial #2 = .104, with planned comparisons revealing the expected pattern of 
decreased response bias in the stress condition (see Figure 5). A main effect of Block also 
emerged, F(2, 76) = 10.02, p<.001, partial #2 = .209, with planned contrasts revealing 
Block 1< Block 2< Block 3, all ps<.05, suggesting a pattern of increasing response bias 
across blocks in both conditions. 
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Figure 5. Group differences in the effect of stress on response bias 
 
  Hypothesis 2. Compared to controls, individuals in the worry/GAD group will 
exhibit greater hedonic deficits as a result of stress. Therefore, the worry/GAD group will 
exhibit a greater reduction in response bias during stress than the control group. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed with Group (control, worry) as a 
between-subjects factor and Condition (no stress, stress) and Block (1, 2, 3) as repeating 
within-subjects factors to test for a Group x Condition interaction. A significant main 
effect of Block emerged, F(2, 152) = 12.25, p<.001, partial #2 = .139, with planned 
contrasts revealing the expected Block 1< Block 2< Block 3 pattern of increasing 
response bias, all ps<.01.A significant main effect of Group, F(1, 76) = 4.34, p = .041, 
partial #2 = .054, was qualified by a significant Group x Condition interaction, F(1, 76) = 
6.655, p = .012, partial #2 = .081. Follow up tests revealed no group differences in mean 
response bias scores in the no stress condition, p>.05. However, in the stress condition 
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the worry group had significantly higher mean response bias scores, F(1, 76) = 9.95, p = 
.002 (see Figure 5). Visual inspection of graphs showed that although the hypothesized 
interaction was significant, the form of the interaction was opposite our expectation—the 
worry group showed intact hedonic capacity during the stress condition. A repeated 
measures ANOVA performed separately for the worry group indicated that the effect of 
Condition was nonsignificant (p = .13). Thus, for worry group members response bias 
scores were unchanged across conditions, while control participants exhibited expected 
decreases under stress.   
Parallel tests of Hypothesis 2 were performed comparing controls to the worry 
subgroup meeting GAD diagnostic criteria (n=22). Similar to previous analyses, a 
significant effect of Block emerged, F(2, 118) = 6.54, p = .002, partial #2 = .100, with 
planned contrasts showing marginally significant differences between blocks, Block 1 < 
Block 2 (p=.055) and Block 2 < Block 3 (p=.050). Also similar to previous analyses, a 
significant main effect of Group, F(1, 59) = 7.98, p=.006, partial #2 = .119, was qualified 
by a marginally significant Group x Condition interaction, F(1, 59) = 3.69, p = .059, 
partial #2 = .059. Follow up tests revealed a similar pattern to worry analyses; the GAD 
group showed significantly higher response bias scores in the stress condition, F(1, 59) = 
9.32, p = .003, and no group differences in the no stress condition. Again, separate 
analyses in the GAD group revealed no condition-related changes in response bias among 
GAD individuals (p = .419), suggesting a similar pattern of stable response bias under 
stress. In sum, analyses of GAD individuals were similar to worry group analyses, with 
the GAD group showing static response bias scores in the stress condition. Given the 
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similarity of results for GAD and worry groups further analyses focused upon the larger 
high worry group.  
Given group differences in reported increases in state anxiety, negative affect, 
arousal, and negative task appraisal (as well as decreases in positive affect and positive 
task appraisals), repeated measures analyses were repeated in the full sample including 
each of these measures as covariates. Results remained unchanged, with none of the 
covariates emerging significant in the model (all ps>.05) and the Group x Condition 
interaction reported above remaining significant in each analysis (all ps<.05). These 
results suggest that group differences in response bias were unlikely to be due to elevated 
task anxiety or negative task appraisals in the worry group.   
  Discriminability, Accuracy, and Reaction Time analyses. Separate repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed for discriminability, accuracy, and reaction time 
with Group as a between-subjects factor, and Condition and Block as repeating within-
subjects factors. No significant effects were found for Group, Condition, Block, or any 
interaction for discriminability, suggesting that participants in both groups were able to 
discriminate short and long stimuli similarly across blocks and stressor conditions. In 
reaction time analyses, an effect of Block was found, F(2, 152) = 5.64, p = .004, partial 
#2 = .069, with post hoc Bonferroni corrected tests revealing mean differences between 
Block 1 and Blocks 2 and 3 (1< 2 and 3) but no difference between Blocks 2 and 3. This 
suggests that overall participants in both groups became faster at responding after Block 
1 in both conditions, and maintained this pace throughout the next two blocks of that 
condition. Group, Condition, and interaction effects were all non-significant, ruling out 
the possibility that group and condition effects on response bias reflect group differences 
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in overall task performance. 
  Moderation Analyses. Several individual difference variables were chosen a 
priori as potential moderators of the stress effect on response bias. Selection of factors 
was based on established links with depression risk that might serve as modifiers of the 
stress—depression relationship (neuroticism, past depression history), or links to reduced 
laboratory hedonic capacity by prior studies (perceived life stress, Pizzagalli et al., 2007). 
Because the study design involved within-subjects conditions, the method of Judd, 
Kenny, and McClelland (2001) was utilized, which allows tests of whether the magnitude 
of an experimental within-subjects effect (i.e., the change between conditions) is 
moderated by a variable that remains stable across conditions. In this method, the change 
in the dependent variable due to condition was regressed upon individual difference 
variables that were stable across conditions. According to Judd et al. (2001) significant 
regression coefficients would indicate significant moderation of the experimental effect 
by the individual difference variable. Separate analyses were performed for each group. 
Due to differences in directionality of the experimental effect among groups (i.e., 
increases versus decreases from baseline), change scores were computed as baseline – 
stress for controls, and stress – baseline for the worry group to achieve positive change 
scores for both groups.  
Control Group Moderation Analyses. Among controls, the mean change in 
response bias from the baseline to stress condition was a decrease of .101 (SD = .299), 
with a trend toward higher levels of neuroticism predicting less decrease from baseline to 
the stress condition (R2 = .094, F(1, 37) = 3.86, p = .052, r = -.307). To investigate this 
effect further, the control group was divided based on a median split of neuroticism 
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scores and ANOVAs compared the low (<13) and high (13+) scoring neuroticism groups 
on baseline and stress response bias means. Groups did not differ on levels of response 
bias in the stress condition. The high neuroticism group had significantly lower baseline 
response bias (M = .064, SD = .127) than the low neuroticism group (M = .192, SD = 
.233), F(1, 37) = 4.66, p = .037. Thus, among controls, higher neuroticism individuals 
showed low levels of baseline response bias with little change in the stress condition, 
whereas lower neuroticism was associated with higher baseline response bias and a 
greater decrease from baseline during the stress condition. All other potential moderators 
(perceived stress, past depression) were nonsignificant. 
Worry Group Moderation Analyses. In the worry group, neither perceived stress 
nor neuroticism was related to change from baseline to stress conditions. Report of a past 
depressive episode (defined by IDD-L diagnosis) moderated the changes in response bias 
among worriers. A positive depression history was related to less change from baseline to 
stress conditions, R2 = .188, F(1, 37) = 8.58, p = .006, r = -.434. Follow up ANOVAs 
comparing individuals with a past episode (n=18) to never depressed individuals (n=21) 
on response bias indicated that past depressed individuals had higher baseline response 
bias (M = .162, SD = .169) than individuals with no past episode (M = .035, SD = .159), 
F(1, 37) = 5.82, p = .021 (see Figure 6). Individuals with a past episode also had lower 
response bias scores in the stress condition (M = .097, SD = .210) than those with no 
prior episodes (M = .229, SD = .215). In sum, people high in worry exhibited a response 
bias pattern similar to controls if they had a past episode of depression (with mean 
response bias higher at baseline and decreasing in the stress condition). Worry group 
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members with no depression history showed blunted baseline response bias and 
dramatically increased response bias in the stress condition (see Figure 6). 
Effect of a Past Depressive Episode on 
Response Bias among Worriers
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Figure 6. Moderation of response bias by past depression in the worry group 
 
  Exploratory Analyses Correlating Response Bias and Trait Measures. 
Response bias (baseline or stress) was unrelated to perceived stress (PSS), trait anhedonia 
(TEPS), behavioral approach or avoidance (BIS, BAS), trait positive affect (PANAS-T–
PA), or extraversion (NEO-E). Response bias in the stress condition was positively 
correlated to neuroticism (NEO-N, r = .242, p=.033), and marginally correlated with trait 
anxiety (STAI-T, r = .211, p = .064).  
 
Longitudinal Analyses 
Hypothesis 3. Stress-induced hedonic deficits will predict elevated levels of 
depression and anhedonia symptoms one month later. This effect will be seen in both 
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groups, with the worry/GAD group showing an enhanced effect compared with controls. 
Prospective anxiety symptoms will also be investigated as an exploratory outcome 
variable. 
Thirty-four participants (20 controls, 13 worry) completed follow measures of 
depression (BDI-II), anxiety (BAI), and anhedonia (MASQ-AD). Follow up measures 
were completed between 24 and 107 days following the lab visit (M=39.29, SD = 15.63). 
Follow up completers did not differ from non-completers on initial group status, "2(1, 
N=78) = 1.91, p>.05. One way ANOVAs found no differences between completers and 
non-completers on initial BDI-II, BAI, PSWQ, IDD-L, IDD, or response bias scores in 
either condition, all ps>.05.  
Correlation analyses using the entire sample revealed no significant relationship 
of response bias in the stress condition to any of the follow up measures (BDI-II, BAI, 
MASQ-AD). Results were unchanged when number of follow up days was controlled in 
a partial correlation analysis. When groups were analyzed separately, response bias in the 
stress condition was marginally negatively related to future BDI-II scores in the control 
group, with higher stress response bias predicting lower future depression scores. Among 
worriers, stress response bias showed a trend level positive relationship to anhedonia 
(MASQ-AD) in the worry group with higher stress response bias predicting higher future 
depression symptoms (see Table 4). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
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Table 4 
Correlation analyses (controls n=20 above diagonal, worry n=14 group below) 
 
† 
p<.08, *p<.05, **p<.01 
BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory, BAI: Beck Anxiety Inventory, IDD total score: Inventory to Diagnose Depression total 
score, MASQ-AD: Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire – Anhedonia subscale score. 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
           
1.   Baseline response bias - -.249 -.112 -.111 -.079 -.238 -.451* -.161 -.311 -.287 
2.   Stress response bias -.151 
 
- -.080 -.129 -.155  .015 -.407
†
 -.303 -.333 -.348 
3.   BDI-II  .122 -.085 -  .590**  .787**  .414**  .567**  .549*  .497*  .527* 
4.   BAI  .266 -.260  .752** -  .563**  .032  .327  .771**  .379  .292 
5.   IDD total score -.013 -.137  .528**  .384* -  .367*  .526*  .442  .497*  .392 
6.   MASQ-AD  .092 -.012  .603**  .305  .281 -  .650** -.020  .353  .793** 
7.   Follow up BDI-II -.252  .398  .544*  .069  .071  .352 -  .516*  .752**  .725** 
8.   Follow up BAI  .119 -.139  .526  .345  .331  .314  .615* -  .715**  .280 
9.   Follow up IDD total -.468 .507
†
  .427 -.053 -.112  .465  .825**  .292 -  .559* 
10. Follow up MASQ-AD -.502 .510
†
  .571*  .103  .108  .523  .801**  .371  .756** - 
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  Baseline Response Bias as a Predictor of Current and Future Depressive 
Symptoms. Some studies report that higher baseline response bias (specifically the 
change in response bias from Block 1 to Block 3) predicts lower current and future 
depression symptoms, (Pizzagalli et al., 2005), while others find no relationship (Bogdan 
& Pizzagalli, 2006). In the current sample, baseline (no stress) response bias was 
unrelated to current depression, anhedonia, and anxiety measures, but was negatively 
related to future MASQ-AD anhedonia symptoms (r = -.374, p = .035), with a trend for 
BDI-II scores (r = .326, p = .060). Results were virtually unchanged when number of 
days to follow up was partialled out. Lower levels of (or blunted) baseline response bias 
predicted higher depression and anhedonia symptom levels at follow up.  
  Hierarchical regression analyses were run for follow up depression and anhedonia 
measures including their initial values as step 1 predictors to assess whether baseline 
response bias predicted follow up symptoms after accounting for initial symptom levels. 
Because there were no group differences in baseline response bias, these analyses were 
performed in the entire sample. Analyses for future anhedonia (MASQ-AD) in the entire 
sample found no significant effects for baseline response bias after accounting for 
baseline symptoms (p>.05).  Baseline response bias predicted follow up BDI-II scores 
even when baseline BDI-II scores were included in the model (see Table 5). This result 
held when number of follow up days was included in the model. When group status and 
interaction terms were added to the analysis, results were also unchanged, with group and 
all interaction terms nonsignificant. In sum, even after controlling for initial depression 
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symptoms, blunted baseline response bias predicted higher depression symptom levels 
one month later. 
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Table 5 
Regression analyses predicting future depression symptoms  
Predictors R
2
!
 
F! df B SE B ! t p 
         
Analyses for BDI-II         
Step 1 .393** 20.744 1,32      
     Constant    1.999 1.078  1.854 .073 
     Baseline BDI-II    .506 .111 .627 2.555 <.001 
Step 2 .084* 4.999 1,31      
     Constant    2.987 1.108  2.695 .011 
     Baseline BDI-II    .492 .105 .610 4.694 <.001 
     Baseline response bias    -6.794 3.039 -.291 -2.236 .033 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
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Discussion 
 The primary aim of this study was to investigate the effect of stress on hedonic 
capacity among individuals with GAD, a group at greater risk for depression following 
stress. Low hedonic capacity, or anhedonia, may be etiologically significant in the 
development of depression (e.g., Forbes & Dahl, 2005). Previous work suggests life 
stress may reduce hedonic capacity (Berenbaum & Connelly, 1993), and recent 
experimental studies have induced anhedonia behaviorally via a laboratory stressor 
(Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006). We sought to conceptually replicate stress-induced 
anhedonia with a more ecologically valid laboratory stressor, to extend the paradigm to 
investigate GAD in an analog sample (a high worry group), and to examine stress-
induced anhedonia as a predictor of future depression symptoms. Secondary analyses 
examined potential moderators of the effect of stress on hedonic capacity.   
 Consistent with hypotheses and prior work, control participants demonstrated the 
expected baseline reward learning pattern, increasingly modulating their behavior to 
maximize rewards at baseline, and exhibiting behavioral anhedonia under stress. Contrary 
to hypotheses, worriers did not exhibit enhanced hedonic blunting under stress, instead 
showing intact hedonic responding under stress. Surprisingly, when depression history 
was considered, worriers with no past depression history exhibited enhanced hedonic 
responses under stress. Our hypothesis that the magnitude of stress-induced anhedonia 
would predict higher future depression symptoms was not supported. However, blunted 
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baseline hedonic responses predicted higher levels of depression symptoms one month 
later.  Results of the current study suggest 1) previous findings of laboratory stress-
induced anhedonia generalize to a more ecologically valid stressor, 2) a normative 
consequence of stress may be a temporary blunting of hedonic capacity, and 3) this effect 
may be moderated by neuroticism, 4) stress may operate differently among worriers, who 
display intact hedonic responding under stress, 5) past depression may moderate stress 
effects in worriers, and 6) blunted baseline hedonic capacity predicts future depression 
symptoms. Each of these points is discussed in turn, followed by limitations and 
suggestions for future study.  
   
Replication with a More Ecologically Valid Stressor 
  Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) found threat of shock to induce behavioral 
anhedonia in healthy controls. By replicating this effect with the mental math stressor, the 
current study extended this paradigm to a different class of stressors. First, mental math is 
a more ecologically valid stressor with verbal, interpersonal, and evaluative components 
that more closely mimic a broader range of life stressors than the threat of physical harm. 
One could argue that to the extent that the mental math task more closely approximates 
actual life stressors than shock threat, the stress-induced anhedonia effect generalizes to a 
more ecologically valid stressor.  
  Second, the current results demonstrate the effect generalizes to anticipatory 
anxiety of a delayed threat—where the anticipated threat is not immediate. In the Bogdan 
and Pizzagalli (2006) study, participants completed the response bias task while 
continually viewing the likelihood that they might receive a shock purportedly based on 
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their own performance. Participants were therefore anticipating an immediate threat (i.e., 
shock that could occur any second). In the current study, participants anticipated a 
delayed threat. Participants completed an observed and evaluated mental math task 
during which they were frequently prompted for speed and accuracy by a voice over an 
intercom. Upon completion, they were told to anticipate performing an even more 
difficult version of this task and were continually reminded of that anticipated task while 
the dependent variable (response bias) was being measured. Naturally-occurring life 
stress often involves either anticipating the delayed threat of a potentially negative 
outcome (e.g., medical test results, company lay offs, an upcoming public speaking 
engagement) or anticipating immediate threat during an acute stressor (e.g., the act of 
public speaking, an interpersonal confrontation). Taken together with previous results, 
the current findings suggest that both immediate and delayed threats can impair hedonic 
capacity. 
 
Stress-Induced Anhedonia May be Normative 
  The finding of stress-induced anhedonia in control participants is consistent with 
prior experimental and nonexperimental findings of reduced hedonic capacity during 
stress (e.g., Berebaum & Connelly, 1993; Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006; Henriques & 
Davidson, 1994), adding to a growing body of work that suggests experiencing stress 
temporarily reduces individuals’ experience of and responses to reward stimuli. From an 
evolutionary perspective, it makes good sense that organisms would temporarily down 
regulate pursuit of rewards under stressful conditions (e.g., in the presence of a predator 
discontinue search for food or a mate, see Nesse, 2001). The current study and Bogdan 
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and Pizzagalli (2006) add to literature demonstrating that threatening stressors that elicit 
anxiety states induce behavioral anhedonia.   
  How does the temporary stress-induced anhedonia seen in healthy persons relate 
to the pervasive hedonic blunting exhibited during a depressive episode? Depressed 
persons demonstrate baseline hedonic deficits in the laboratory (Henriques & Davidson, 
2000), consistent with the idea that their hedonic deficits can be long lasting. Recent 
work suggests that resolution of depressed mood states may be associated with a 
normalization of baseline hedonic response (Vrieze, Pizzagalli, Demyttenaere, & Claes 
2009). Thus, there is evidence that behavioral anhedonia can be long lasting while a 
person is in a mood episode and can be induced temporarily by anxiety-provoking 
stressors in healthy persons. It is unknown, however, whether hedonic deficits 
accompany other negative mood states (e.g., sad mood) that occur outside of depressive 
episodes at low levels of severity (e.g., mood fluctuations in healthy persons). Although 
the current study found no relationship of baseline hedonic capacity to current reports of 
depression symptoms, which is consistent with Bodgan and Pizzagalli (2006), others 
have found higher baseline hedonic responding related to lower current depression 
symptoms (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). As anhedonia is increasingly being considered 
etiologically significant in the development of depression, understanding normative 
variations in hedonic capacity—and the mood or emotion states that can elicit these 
changes—can inform our understanding of the development of persistent anhedonic 
responding seen in MDD.  
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Stress-Induced Anhedonia is Moderated by Neuroticism 
  Secondary moderation analyses indicated that controls characterized by high 
neuroticism demonstrated blunted baseline hedonic capacity that showed little change 
under stress, whereas lower neuroticism exhibited the normative response pattern of 
higher baseline response bias and a greater decrease from baseline during stress. In the 
context of a life stress literature that suggests that individuals with higher neuroticism are 
at greater risk of developing depression after a stressor (see Kessler, 1997), these results 
suggest that one way neuroticism may influence the stress–depression relationship is by 
blunting baseline hedonic capacity. The pattern of blunted hedonic capacity at baseline is 
similar to the pattern seen in depressed samples (e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 2005). At the same 
time, there was no relationship between response bias and current depression or anxiety 
symptoms, even though these constructs were both correlated with neuroticism in this 
sample (rs = .66 and .57, BDI-II and BAI respectively, ps<.001). Neuroticism, a known 
risk factor for both depression and anxiety, was investigated as a stress moderator 
because of strong prior links to enhancing the depressogenic effects of life stress. The 
current study offers preliminary evidence that high neuroticism may be linked to blunted 
baseline reward functioning, and although neuroticism levels were not related to hedonic 
capacity during stress in this sample, more evidence is needed before concluding that no 
relationship exists. 
   
Intact and Hyper-Hedonic Stress Response in Worriers 
 Given prior findings that GAD increases the depressogenic effects of stress 
(Hettema et al., 2006), it was hypothesized that compared to controls individuals high in 
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trait worry (an analog GAD group) would exhibit a more dramatic decrease in hedonic 
capacity following stress. Although worriers exhibited baseline hedonic capacity similar 
to controls, contrary to expectation, they exhibited intact hedonic capacity following 
stress. Depression history was investigated as a potential moderator of stress effects on 
hedonic capacity. Surprisingly, worriers with a history of depression displayed the 
normative pattern of baseline reward learning and behavioral anhedonia under stress, 
while worriers without past depression displayed blunted baseline hedonic capacity and 
enhanced hedonic responses under stress.  
 The differential effects of stress on hedonic capacity may seem counterintuitive at 
first glance, as one might assume that individuals at risk for psychopathology (especially 
depression) should display deficient—not intact or enhanced—hedonic responding under 
stressful conditions. In considering this surprising effect, it is first important that we were 
able to rule out several methodological or third variable interpretations. First, there were 
no group differences in any other dependent variable measured during the signal 
detection task (accuracy, discriminability, reaction time), which suggests that the stress 
effect is specific to hedonic response in this case, and not driven by group differences in 
task performance. Second, although worriers reported higher depression symptoms, 
which typically would be expected to blunt hedonic responding, depression symptoms 
did not relate to behavioral anhedonia on this task. Finally, even though worriers reported 
the stressor task to be more anxiety-provoking than controls, the magnitude of 
participants’ anxious responses to the stressor were unrelated to hedonic responses, 
preventing this from explaining the pattern of group differences in hedonic capacity in 
the current study.   
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  Mainstream theoretical accounts of anxiety disorders, including GAD, have 
generally not integrated reward system functioning, working under the assumption that 
anxiety is functionally unrelated to hedonic capacity (e.g., Borkovec’s GAD avoidance 
theory, see Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004, cf. Kashdan & Hofmann, 2008). There are 
few studies exploring reward response in anxiety disorders, and none that explore 
hedonic capacity under stress. Observed aberrations in hedonic capacity are generally 
considered a direct function of unipolar or bipolar mood disorder comorbidity (see 
Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; McIntyre et al., 2006), and aside from mood disorder 
comorbidity, anxious groups typically do not report global deficits in hedonic capacity 
(Dyck et al., 1994). However, the emotion dysregulation model of GAD put forth by 
Mennin and colleagues (2005; 2008) theorizes broadly that GAD is associated with 
hyperreactivity to various emotional contexts and is a useful framework for considering 
aberrant reward responding in GAD. The emotion dysregulation theory suggests that in 
GAD worry functions to dampen or suppress emotional hyperarousal that GAD 
individuals find aversive. Although the preponderance of evidence in support of this 
theory has investigated hyperreactivity in negative contexts, there is some evidence that 
individuals with GAD may be more reactive to pleasant emotions as well. In one study, 
analog GAD participants were more responsive a pleasant piece of music than controls, 
reporting significant reductions in physiological anxiety symptoms following the 
manipulation whereas controls reported no changes (Mennin et al., 2005). Additionally, 
individuals with GAD report experiencing emotional situations as more intense than 
controls (without regard to valence), and report being more fearful of experiencing 
positive emotions than controls (Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). 
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Taken together with these findings, the current results adds to this preliminary evidence 
that analog GAD may be associated with increased hedonic responses under certain 
circumstances.  
 An evolutionary perspective is also potentially helpful for understanding these 
results. As described in a previous section, it may be adaptive for organisms to suspend 
reward learning under conditions of stress, which accounts for controls experiencing 
intact hedonic responding at baseline and blunted hedonic responding under stress. Thus, 
the demonstration of intact hedonic responding under stress among worriers (or enhanced 
responses in the never-depressed subgroup), may represent a maladaptive response 
pattern characteristic of GAD and high worry groups. By not responding appropriately to 
an environmental threat (in this case by increasing reward learning even when 
experiencing a stressor as more frightful than controls do), worriers may be exhibiting a 
unique brand of context insensitivity (see Rottenberg, 2005 for context insensitivity 
theory of depression). If personal resources are being allocated toward potential rewards 
during a threatening time, the individual may be less able to deal with the threat (i.e., 
more vulnerable to potential negative outcomes as a result). Mennin’s emotion regulation 
theory (e.g., Mennin et al., 2005; 2008) posits broadly that GAD is associated with 
emotional inflexibility, with diminished ability to respond adaptively to and regulate 
emotions in a given context. However, this and other theoretical accounts of anxiety have 
focused mainly upon negative emotions and lack specific predictions about responses to 
positive stimuli or rewards. The current findings suggest that GAD and worry may be 
associated with maladaptive responses to threat, in the form of intact reward learning 
during a time when this response may be detrimental.   
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The Effect of Past Depression on Hedonic Responses under Stress among Worriers 
  Given previous findings relating current depression to blunted hedonic capacity 
(e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 2005), one could argue that past depression might be expected to 
continue to blunt baseline hedonic capacity, especially in individuals at risk for 
depression. However, our results suggest the opposite effect: among those at risk for 
depression by way of analog GAD a past depressive episode was associated with a 
response pattern similar to controls, with mean response bias higher at baseline and 
decreasing in the stress condition, and those with no depression history showed blunted 
baseline response bias and dramatically increased bias in the stress condition (see Figure 
6). This finding is puzzling, especially given the lack of effects for current depression 
symptoms. Both groups (worriers with and without depression history) are at increased 
risk for depression, but only the worriers without depression history exhibit strong 
aberrations in reward response. Could these group differences be indicative of two 
distinct subgroups? Perhaps hedonic capacity operates differently in worriers before and 
after depression onset. That is, prior to depression onset worriers may show blunted 
baseline hedonic capacity that is heightened under stress, but exposure to a depressive 
episode may lead to enduring changes in how stress affects hedonic capacity.  
  Other depression risk factors, such as family history of depression have been 
shown to further blunt hedonic capacity following stress. Berenbaum and Connelly 
(1993) examined non-depressed people and found that individuals with and without a 
family history of depression had similar intact hedonic capacity in a control condition, 
and although both groups showed decreased hedonic capacity in the stress condition, this 
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effect was enhanced for individuals at risk for depression. That is, the presence of a 
depression risk factor was associated with enhanced blunting of hedonic capacity under 
stress. In combination with the current findings, hedonic responding under stress may be 
differentially influenced by various depression risk factors (i.e., past depression, worry, 
family history of depression), perhaps suggesting that individual factors may affect the 
stress-hedonic response relationship distinct ways, increasing depression risk via unique 
mechanisms. 
 
Predicting Future Depression 
  Examining how reward biases relate to future depression can elucidate what 
response bias patterns are potentially linked with an important clinical outcome. Hedonic 
capacity in the no stress baseline condition, but not in the stress condition, predicted 
future depression symptoms. In the entire sample, lower baseline hedonic capacity was 
related to worse outcomes (higher depression symptoms) at follow up, even after 
accounting for initial symptom levels. This is consistent with results from a prior study of 
behavior hedonic capacity (Pizzagalli et al., 2005), as well as previous work utilizing 
other indices of reward responding and positive emotionality that suggest that higher 
levels of baseline levels of hedonic capacity are associated with positive mental and 
physical health outcomes (see Morris et al., 2009). Prediction of symptoms via a 
behavioral measure of hedonic capacity (such as the task utilized in the current study) is 
particularly informative, as it provides a more objective, implicit assessment of reward 
responding than self-report assessments (see Pizzagalli et al., 2005). This finding adds to 
other evidence that pre-morbid hedonic functioning may be etiologically significant in 
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the development of depression (e.g., Forbes & Dahl, 2005), with lower baseline hedonic 
responding related to higher depression risk. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
  The current study had a number of features that limit the generalizability of these 
results. First, only females undergraduates were included, which precludes generalization 
to male or community samples. Second, although the laboratory stressor used in the 
current study is more ecologically valid than the threat of shock stressor used in Bogdan 
& Pizzagalli (2006), it is still artificial and does not resemble many real life stressors. 
Future studies examining daily life stressors, perhaps utilizing experience-sampling 
techniques, will be needed to understand how these results map onto behaviors outside 
the laboratory. Additionally, broader behavioral correlates of baseline hedonic capacity 
need to be examined in order to generalize performance on a response bias task to reward 
response in the individual’s actual environment. Third, to increase the feasibility of the 
study we used self-report instruments to select our sample; one should be cautious about 
generalization to DSM syndromes until results are replicated in samples constituted by 
diagnostic interview measures of GAD as well as current and past MDD. Finally, future 
studies are needed to replicate and explicate the novel findings of this study, specifically 
increased hedonic capacity under stress among worriers, and the role of past depression 
in modulating this effect.   
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Summary and Conclusions 
The present study aimed to test a model where at-risk individuals experience 
enhanced deficits in hedonic capacity as a result of stress. Extending a previous study of 
stress-induced hedonic deficits in healthy controls (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006), this was 
the first study to examine the impact of stress on hedonic capacity in a group at elevated 
risk for developing depressive symptoms. A behavioral measure of anhedonia was 
acquired from an analog GAD sample (a high worry group) and control participants 
during baseline no-stress and stress conditions. Hedonic capacity was indexed by 
participants’ ability to modulate responses to maximize reward on a signal detection task 
incorporating tangible reward for correct responses. controls exhibited the expected 
reward learning pattern in the baseline condition, demonstrating intact hedonic 
responding, as well as the expected pattern of behavioral anhedonia under stress. 
Contrary to predictions, worriers demonstrated intact hedonic capacity under stress. This 
effect was modulated by past depression diagnostic status, where worriers with no past 
history of a depressive episode demonstrated blunted hedonic capacity at baseline and 
heightened hedonic capacity under stress. Alternatively, worriers with a positive life 
history of depression demonstrated a response pattern more similar to controls. For both 
groups, blunted baseline measures of hedonic capacity predicted higher depression scores 
at follow up. Stress appears to operate differently on behavioral hedonic capacity in 
worried and control groups, and this group effect is even more striking when history of 
depression is accounted for. Future studies are needed to further explicate the 
mechanisms by which reward response may be modulated differentially under stress 
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among worriers and non-worriers, as well as how this might change as a function of 
having experienced a depressive episode.  
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